MCA provided more concrete rules on the question of the tribunal's ability to proceed in the defendant's absence. It also provided rules on the defendant's ability to see evidence against him. In addition, the MCA included a number of provisions on the admissibility of evidence obtained through coercion.
The MCA's provisions regarding the admissibility of evidence obtained by coercion are three-fold. Under the MCA, a tribunal must suppress evidence obtained through torture, defined as treatment intended to cause "severe pain." In cases where the pain caused is "serious," but not "severe,'; the tribunal should admit evidence if it is reliable, probative, and serves the interests of justice. Finally, for evidence obtained on or after December 30, 2005, the MCA provides that courts should admit statements that are reliable, probative, and were not obtained through "cruel, unusual, and inhumane treatment" that would violate the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.
The United States, International
Law, and Torture after September 11
These provisions are necessary because of the apparent abusive treatment of detainees that occurred after the attacks of September 11, 2001 , and lasted at least through 2003. During this time, the United States, primarily through the CIA but also through some military personnel, engaged in a spectrum of practices designed to produce information, elicit confessions, and "break" detainees. These practices included water-boarding, in which a detainee is tied supine to a board, his face is covered, and interrogators pour water over his face to simulate drowning. Other practices included prolonged standing, the protracted use of stress positions in which the subject stands on tip-toes or leans against a wall supporting himself by his fingertips, sleep deprivation lasting for two days or more, and exposure to extremes of hot and cold. These "alternative methods" of interrogation, as the Bush Administration has described them, have produced only modest results. Accounts of the interrogation of Al Qaeda figures indicate that normal interrogation methods yielded useful information, but that escalating tactics to include alternative methods produced little data of value about impending attacks. Moreover, many detainees at Guantdnamo and elsewhere are either foot-soldiers in the Taliban, terrorist wannabees, or simply people in the wrong place at the wrong time offered up for bounty. Even if inclined to talk, they often have little information to impart.
International law has increasingly frowned on coercive methods of interrogation, stressing their harshness against the backdrop of their lack of efficacy. Barred by the Convention Against Tor- courts' recognition of the unreliability of confessions "forced from the mind by ... the torture of fear" pre-dates the American Constitution, and was surely familiar to the framers. Although courts have often cited the unreliability of such statements, they have also looked more broadly to the corrosive effect of coercion on the institutions of justice, government, and society. Once tolerated, habits of coercion are difficult to break. Indeed, such habits develop their own institutional momentum, outliving any efficacy that "alternative methods" may enjoy The spread of institutional acceptance may also exacerbate political and social inequality, as officials identify subjects of coercion, including non-citizens, the poor, and groups subordinated on the basis of race, religion, or ethnicity. The political branches often give such institutional costs short shrift, preferring, as in the MCA, to stress the semblance of security over more abiding concerns. The result is a danger to democratic governance at home, and to reputation abroad. As the Supreme Court has observed, "human values are sacrificed where an agency of the government ... wrings a confession out of an accused against his will." 9 According to the Court, a government pursuing legitimate interests in safety and security "must obey the law while enforcing the law ... life and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves." 0 Courts do not have the luxury of remaining indifferent to coercive methods. When they turn a blind eye to such practices and preside over or affirm judgments thus secured, they become complicit in institutional decline. Permitting evidence obtained through coercion to be admitted undermines the adversarial system that the Framers envisioned as a bulwark of liberty, imposing an "inquisitorial character" 11 on American justice that transforms the judge from a neutral referee to a partisan ally of the government. The cases demonstrate this concern with torture. The notion of the person in custody as helpless, without the means to fairly counter coercion, is echoed in cases from the 1800s to Miranda that warn against granting the government the power to "press the witness unduly, ... browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant,. The Supreme Court has rejected the absolutist view that the Constitution applies with equal force here and abroad. Practical impediments to such blanket coverage have driven the courts to a more pragmatic approach. However, despite rejecting an absolutist view of the extraterritorial application of constitutional guarantees, courts have imposed significant constraints on government overreaching, particularly in the area of fundamental rights. Moreover, courts have recognized that violating fundamental rights abroad to gain an advantage in a United States tribunal threatens the legal system's integrity.
When dealing with evidence obtained by foreign governments prior to a defendant's trial in United States courts, courts have invoked their supervisory power over government law enforcement and applied the "shock the conscience" test. The Supreme Court announced this test in the pre-Miranda case of Rochin v. California 16 to forbid the warrantless stomachpumping of a suspect. Applying this test to the extraterritorial context, courts have looked to the degree of coercion used by agents of foreign governments, and in at least one case disallowed evidence obtained through egregious physical abuse of the defendant. Since the courts apply the "shock the conscience" standard to conduct by foreign governments, this test should be a floor for assessing United States conduct at home or abroad. Indeed, Judge Henry Friendly, for whom Chief Justice John Roberts once served as a law clerk, noted in Birdsell v. United States 17 that courts could exercise their supervisory authority to prevent federal officials from leveraging abusive conduct abroad into a strategic advantage at trial.
Moreover, judges have often been pragmatic in marking the scope of the Constitution's extraterritorial applicability, sending signals that the government must observe fundamental rights. In Downes v. Bidwell, i " one of the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution did not apply across the board to a territory such as Puerto Rico. Accordingly, the Court upheld a duty imposed on goods shipped from Puerto Rico which would otherwise have violated the Constitution. However, the Court, in its plurality opinion, also indicated that residents of territories would retain core rights granted under the Constitution and rooted in natural law, including a right to due process and to the protection of "life, liberty, and property."
In more recent cases, pragmatic concurrences played a significant role. In Reid v. Covert, 19 for example, Justice Harlan's concurrence recognized that due process required a jury trial in a capital prosecution involving the spouse of an American serviceman located abroad. Harlan argued that, given the stakes involved, this safeguard was necessary to ensure the fairness and independence of the tribunal. At this level of fundamental rights, the courts could also bring international law back in, to inform the court's interpretation of constitutional guarantees. The status of torture as a violation of jus cogens dovetails with the recognition in The Insular Cases of fundamental norms guaranteed under natural law and the Constitution and with Harlan's recognition in Reid and Kennedy's recognition in Verdugo-Urquidez of the abiding applicability of due process. The Court should view the jus cogens status of torture, as well as the increasingly disfavored status of lesser forms of coercion, as barring evidence obtained through tactics that inflict pain.
Conclusion
Courts have an array of interpretive tools at their disposal to reconcile the MCA with abiding values that inform the rule of law. First, courts can interpret the MCA to broadly construe the meaning of "torture," and thus categorically exclude evidence obtained through abusive treatment. Second, courts can construe the statutory term "reliable" narrowly, to exclude evidence such as statements obtained through coercion that Anglo-American courts have historically regarded as suspect. Third, courts can use their supervisory power over federal authorities to bar evidence obtained through methods that "shock the conscience." Fourth, courts can hold that the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Due Process clause apply to military commissions convened at Guantdnamo and require the suppression of statements made under coercion by either the defendant or by third parties such as fellow detainees.
This array of interpretive tools has limits. The pragmatic jurisprudence outlined above will not grant detainees a package of rights identical to those enjoyed by defendants in American civilian courts. Indeed, mandating a rigid equivalence of rights might deprive the government of flexibility it needs to effectively combat terrorism. A pragmatic approach will grant the government this flexibility, while obliging military commissions to observe core norms that support the rule of law. 
